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SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT-BREACH OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARY
DUTY-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
ruled that a company that adopted a shareholder's right plan did
not violate Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act or Rule
10b-5, since the corporate officers and board members did not omit
facts or misinform the public as to any material matter regarding
the plan.
Lewis v Chrysler Corporation, 949 F2d 644 (3d Cir 1991).
In February 1988, Chrysler Corporation and its board of direc-
tors (hereinafter "Chrysler") adopted a "poison pill" plan,1
designed to protect Chrysler from a hostile takeover.2 Under the
plan, Chrysler stockholders received one preferred share purchase
right on each outstanding share of Chrysler common stock.3 Each
purchase right could be exercised following certain triggering
events." Chrysler amended the plan in 1989.1 A second amendment
1. "A 'poison pill' refers generally to preferred stock, rights, warrants, options, or
debt instruments that an actual or potential target company distributes to its security hold-
ers. These instruments are designed to deter nonnegotiated takeovers by conferring certain
rights on shareholders upon the occurrence of a 'triggering event,' such as a tender offer or
third party acquisition of a specified percentage of stock. A flip-in right is a right to acquire
stock of the target; a flip-over right is a right to acquire stock of the offeror. These rights
usually have little value until the triggering event occurs, but may subsequently become
quite expensive for any party to redeem or purchase." Lewis v Chrysler Corporation, 949
F2d 644, 646 n 2 (3d Cir 1991), citing Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, 5 Securities Regulation
2148 (3d ed 1990).
2. Lewis, 949 F2d at 646.
3. Id.
4. Id. The plan became operational 10 days after the first public disclosure that a
person or group acquired, or obtained the right to acquire, beneficial ownership of 30% or
more of Chrysler's outstanding common stock, or 10 days after the first public disclosure or
actual commencement of a tender or exchange offer intended to result in the offeror becom-
ing the beneficial owner of 30% or more of Chrysler's outstanding common stock. Id. The
purchase rights created by the Plan entitled Chrysler stockholders to purchase 1/100th of
one share of Junior Participating Cumulative preferred Chrysler Stock from the company at
a purchase price of $120. The Plan stated that following certain events the poison pill pre-
ferred purchase right would entitle holders to exercise "flip-in" rights to buy Chrysler com-
mon stock at one-half market value or, alternatively, "flip-over" rights to buy common
shares in an entity whose announced or actual acquisition of Chrysler common stock trig-
gered the exercise of purchase rights. Id.
5. Lewis, 949 F2d at 646. The 30% threshold of an acquiring entity's beneficial own-
ership in Chrysler needed to trigger exercise of the shareholder rights under the Plan was
reduced to 20%. The 1989 amendment also added an additional "flip-in" event: Chrysler
shareholders would be entitled to purchase, at one-half market price, common stock of any
would-be acquiror if Chrysler's Board of Directors declared such acquiror to be an "adverse
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to the plan was announced in a December 1990 press release, after
Mr. Kirk Kerkorian, an investor, had acquired in excess of nine
percent of Chrysler's outstanding common stock.' The pertinent
part of the press release, on which the appellant's securities fraud
claim is based, is as follows:
The Company [Chrysler] said: 'The amendments adopted today are in-
tended to enhance the ability of Chrysler's Board to act in the best inter-
est of all the Company's shareholders if someone should seek to obtain a
position of control or substantial influence over Chrysler.7
Shortly after the 1990 amendments to the plan were announced,
Harriet Lewis (hereafter Lewis), a common stockholder of
Chrysler, filed her original complaint against Chrysler in United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,'
claiming that Chrysler violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b) 9 and Rule 10b-5.10
The original complaint also alleged that Chrysler's board members
breached their state law fiduciary duties to the corporation's com-
mon shareholders."
On January 22, 1991, Chrysler filed motions to dismiss the SEC
fraud count, and to dismiss the state law count based on lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 2 During oral argument on Chrysler's
motion to dismiss, the appellant offered to present an amended
complaint to the court within one week, but she failed to do so."3
As a result, the district court dismissed both counts of the com-
person" after determining that he had become the beneficial owner of at least 10% of
Chrysler common stock then outstanding, and that such beneficial ownership was intended
to cause the company to repurchase the acquiror's shares or would cause a material adverse
impact on Chrysler's business. Id.
6. Id at 647. The press release announced an unsolicited stock purchase by Ker-
korian and the following amendments to its share purchase rights plan: The threshold for
the plan to "flip-in" was reduced from 20% to 10%, and eliminated the provision that re-
quired the Board of Directors to declare an acquiror an "adverse person" before the plan
rights were triggered. The amendment further attached a provision that, if someone ac-
quired 10%, but less than 50%, of Chrysler's common stock, the Board of Directors may
exchange each right (other than those held by the 10% holder) for one share of common
stock. Id.
7. Lewis, 949 F2d at 647. (emphasis in original.)
8. Id. Ms. Lewis filed the complaint on behalf of herself and other Chrysler share-
holders similarly situated. Id.
9. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat 891 (1934), codified at 15 USC
§78j(b) (1990).
10. 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1990). Lewis, 949 F2d at 647.
11. Lewis, 949 F2d at 647-8.




plaint on February 25, 1991, on the grounds that the appellant,
along with the other class members, lacked standing to sue under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1 The district court determined that
the original complaint did not contain allegations of fact, which, if
true, would have made the class members either "purchasers" or
"sellers" of securities within the meaning of the SEC statute and
rule.15 The state law count was dismissed by the lower court due to
lack of pendent jurisdiction. 6
Before she received a copy of the district court's dismissal opin-
ion, Lewis filed an amended complaint.17 Appellant motioned the
district court for reconsideration of the dismissal of her original
complaint, and Chrysler motioned to strike or dismiss her
amended complaint."8 The district court granted Chrysler's motion
and dismissed the appellant's amended complaint, concluding that
the amended complaint also failed to state a claim under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5."e The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
granted appellant plenary review on each dismissal.2"
The appellate court noted that in order for a private plaintiff to
obtain relief under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder, there must be a misstatement or omission of a mate-
rial fact, in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.2
14. Id.
15. Id. The Securities Exchange Act limits its reach to securities fraud that occurs
"in connection with the purchase or sale" of any security. 15 USC §78j(b) (1990). Therefore
if there is no purchase or sale of securities that executes the fraud, there can be no federal
securities law violation.
16. Lewis, 949 F2d at 648. Pendent jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction that may
be extended by a federal court to a state matter that is related to a federal law claim prop-
erly brought before it. Black's Law Dictionary 1134 (West, 6th ed 1990).
17. The first count in the amended complaint listed one count of securities fraud
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Lewis, 949 F2d at 648. The appellant expanded on her
specific allegations of fraud in the amended complaint. The second count of the amended
complaint alleged breach of fiduciary duties by Chrysler's board of directors. The final count
of the amended complaint asserted that Chrysler violated Section 242 of Delaware's General
Corporation Law. 8 Del Code Ann §242 (1990). Chrysler Corporation is incorporated in the
state of Delaware. Lewis, 949 F2d at 648.
18. Lewis, 949 F2d at 648.
19. Id.
20. Id. A plenary review occurs when an appellate court reviews the record of the
trial court to determine if the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss was properly based
upon the interpretation or application of a legal precept. Id at n 4, citing Federal Kemper
Insurance Company v Rauscher, 807 F2d 345, 348 (3d Cir 1986).
21. Lewis, 949 F2d at 648. The pertinent part of Rule 10b-5 is set forth as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device scheme, or artifice to defraud.
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The court continued that in order to state a securities fraud claim
under Section 10(b), a private plaintiff is required to plead a false
representation of a material fact; defendant's knowledge of its fal-
sity and his intention that plaintiff rely on it;s2 the plaintiff's rea-
sonable reliance thereon; and his resultant loss.23 In a similar vein,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that a pleading aver-
ring fraud or mistake must state with particularity the alleged
fraudulent or mistaken acts, in order to put the one against whom
the charge is made on notice of the alleged misconduct.24
The question of whether corporate mismanagement occurred
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is central to a claim under this
section, and therefore the court reiterated that the complaint must
allege a misrepresentation or omission in the flow of material infor-
mation.26 The court noted that there is a fundamental difference
between "mere mismanagement" and "a material nondisclosure." 6
While management misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or deception
would violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, management's breach
of its fiduciary duty alone would not constitute a transgression of
the statute or the rule.17 The court held that the appellant's origi-
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1990).
The court assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that the appellant and the class were
"purchasers" within the meaning of §10(b) and lOb-5, which applies only when specific acts
are committed "upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security".
Lewis, 949 F2d at 648 n 5, citing 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1990).
22. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649. Recklessness, as opposed to actual intent, will also suffice.
Lewis, 949 F2d at 649, citing Zlotnick v TIE Communications, 836 F2d 818, 821 (3d Cir
1988).
23. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649.
24. Id at 650. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) states:
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of
mind of a person may be averred generally.
FRCP 9(b).
25. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649. See Craftmatic Securities Litigation v Kraftsow, 890 F2d
628, 639 (3d Cir 1989). In Craftmatic, the appellants alleged that failure of Craftmatic's
management to reveal its future course of business and profitability in a stock offering pro-
spectus constituted a material omission in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id.
26. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649, citing Craftmatic 890 F2d at 639. The court in Craftmatic
also indicated that the line between the two was often difficult to draw. Id.
27. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649 citing Craftmatic, 890 F2d at 638, and Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v Green, 430 US 462, 476 (1977). (Holding that acts of corporate mismanagement
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nal complaint failed to assert any particular misrepresentation or
omission of material fact, 8 and accordingly upheld the district
court's dismissal of appellant's original complaint for failure to
state a claim.2 '
The court further observed that while appellant's amended com-
plaint gave fuller description of the alleged actions and omissions
that constituted the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation, it too
failed to allege with particularity any claim under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 as required by FRCP 9(b). 30 Specifically, the lan-
guage of the 1990 Release, relied upon by appellant, made no
claim, thus precluding the conclusion of a false and misleading
do not violate Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 in the absence of a material deception, misrepre-
sentation, or failure to disclose). Id.
28. Id at 650. An essential element of any Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 proceeding,
required to be pleaded with particularity under FRCP 9(b). Id.
In order to determine whether information is "material" under §10(b) and Rule lob-5, the
court used the criterion set forth in Basic v Levison, 485 US 224 (1988). Lewis, 949 F2d at
649. Basic, 485 US at 231-2, quoting TSC Industries, Inc. v Northway, Inc., 426 US 438, 449
(1976), expressed the materiality of omitted information by looking to whether there is "'a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made avail-
able.'" Id.
Continuing to use standards articulated in Basic, the court also looked to whether the
appellant's original complaint averred an omission of information that was material. Lewis,
949 F2d at 649. Basic expressly adopted the materiality standard of TSC Industries, 426 US
at 449, for use in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases. Id. TSC Industries announced that
information is "material" if there is a substantial likelihood that, under all the circum-
stances, the information would have assumed "actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable shareholder." Lewis, 949 F2d at 649 quoting TSC Industries, 426 US at 449.
In reviewing information that is allegedly omitted by management, the court remarked
that the contingency or speculativeness of the information must be evaluated to determine
its significance. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649, citing Basic, 485 US at 231.
In evaluating the appellant's original complaint, the court examined Lewis' allegations of
deception and manipulation, breach of fiduciary duties, and conspiracy to keep Chrysler's
board members in control and prohibit others from gaining control. Lewis' complaint also
alleged that the December 1990 amendments to the poison pill plan and Chrysler's an-
nouncement of it were allegedly undertaken to further Chrysler's preexisting conspiracy.
Lewis, 949 F2d at 649.
29. Lewis, 949 F2d at 650. Although the appellate court held the dismissal of the
original complaint was correct because it failed to state with particularity the misrepresen-
tations and omissions it alleged under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5, the district court dis-
missed on other grounds. Id at 646.
30. Appellant's amended complaint was not timely filed, but the appellate court con-
sidered it as if it was filed on time. Id at 650.
The court only considered the allegations in the amended complaint that it determined
warranted discussion. The others it summarily dismissed due to their failure to state any
particular misrepresentation or omission of material fact which would satisfy the pleading
requirements of Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5. Lewis, 949 F2d at 650.
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The court refuted the contention that the Release imposed a
duty on Chrysler to disclose how the Amendment benefitted
Chrysler, because shareholders, as investors, are charged with rea-
sonable knowledge of information about management action.32 The
court maintained that because the Release explained in detail the
substance of the Amendment to the poison pill plan, the appellant
could not complain she was deceived that the plan might be used
to prohibit a hostile takeover of Chrysler."s The court continued by
stating that while management's objective in changing the plan
may have been obligatory, its failure to disclose an entrenchment
motive (if it indeed had one) is not actionable under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5.34 The court noted that foiling takeover attempts is
within the scope of the fiduciary duty of corporate management,
and no federal securities law prohibits such action.35 The court ob-
31. Lewis, 949 F2d at 650. The pivotal point of the appellant's amended complaint is
the language of the December 1990 Release. Id. (See above for the language of the Release).
The appellant first asserted that the 1990 amendment to the poison pill plan, as set forth
in the Release, purported to be in the best interests of the shareholders, while in fact, it
solely advanced Chrysler management's interest. Id. The court disagreed, however, noting
that the language of the Release did not contain any claim that the amendment was made
"in the best interest of the shareholders." Id at 651. It made no declaration or promise that
Chrysler had acted or would act in the shareholders' best interests; rather, it merely said
that the Amendment was made to give management the increased ability to act in the
shareholders' interest in the future. The court concluded that since the Release did not
claim to make the Amendment in the best interest of the shareholders, as alleged by appel-
lant, it did not matter who the Amendment benefitted. Id.
32. Id at 651, citing Warner Communications Inc. v Murdoch, 581 F Supp 1482, 1492
(D Del 1984). The knowledge of which shareholders should reasonably be aware includes the
"'universal interest' of corporate officers and directors in maintaining corporate control."
Id.
33. Lewis, 949 F2d at 651.
34. Id, citing Warner Communications, 581 F Supp at 1490.
35. Lewis, 949 F2d at 652, citing Panter v Marshall Field & Co., 646 F2d 271, 290
(7th Cir) cert denied, 454 US 1092 (1981). "The general rule [is] that the federal securities
laws do not impose a duty upon parties to publicly admit the culpability of their actions."
Warner Communications, 581 F Supp at 1490.
There are several policy considerations behind this general rule, the first being that ab-
sent such a rule, management would be required to either acknowledge its supposed miscon-
duct before a court determined the action to be improper, or remain silent and incur sanc-
tions for failing to reveal the wrongdoing. The ,second point is that instances of misconduct
which constitute a breach of the state law management fiduciary duty could be transformed
into a securities fraud violation simply because management fails to reveal its own improper
acts. This was never the intent of the securities laws. The third point is that the general rule
only limits management's duty to affirmatively disclose its misconduct. Management retains
its responsibility to divulge all the material facts surrounding its actions that might relate to
its misconduct. The general rule quite simply discharges management of a duty to say "We
are engaging in misconduct", but it does not discharge it from a duty to say "Here are the
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served that management must make external omissions or misrep-
resentations of its bad intent, and the mere "unclean heart" of
management is not sufficient to constitute a securities violation. 6
The court concluded that the appellant could not "boot-strap" a
breach of state law fiduciary duty into a federal securities case by
contending that the philosophy of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
disclosing material misrepresentations and omissions"7 extends a
burden on management to also divulge its unclean motives for con-
ducting an allegedly unacceptable arrangement.
38
Moreover, the court held that the language of the Release did
give shareholders an adequate description of their rights and man-
agement's prerogative under the amended plan.39 It concluded that
because shareholders are held to have reasonable knowledge that
management will inevitably act to defend itself from a hostile take-
over attempt, the appellant cannot argue that shareholders were
deceived by management's announcement in the Release regarding
amendments to the poison pill plan. 0
The court further ruled that management was not required to
calculate additional cost to investors caused by the Amendment to
the plan. "' As such costs are speculative in nature, failure to dis-
close would not be actionable under either Section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5, because it would not constitute a "material omission."' 2
acts in which we are engaging," thereby leaving the determination of what is "misconduct"
to the courts. Lewis, 949 F2d at 652, citing Warner Communications, 581 F Supp at 1490.
36. Lewis, 949 F2d at 651, quoting Biesenbach v Guenther, 588 F2d 400, 402 (3d Cir
1978).
37. Id at 652, observing the rule set forth in Kademian v Ladish Co., 792 F2d 614,
622 (7th Cir 1986), announced in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v Green, 430 US 462 (1977).
38. Lewis, 949 F2d at 652. The court discharged appellant's argument that Chrysler
was obligated to disclose its alleged entrenchment motives if the Release's language repre-
sented the Amendment to be in the best interest of shareholders, by quoting both
Biesenbach, which held that a securities fraud claim could not be maintained when manage-
ment claims that an arrangement is in the best interest of the shareholders, when it alleg-
edly is not, and Kademian, which held that as long as there has been no fraudulent mis-
statement of a material matter, management has no duty to disclose its motivation in
entering a transaction. Id, citing Biesenbach, 588 F2d at 402 and Kademian, 792 F2d at
623-4.
39. Lewis, 949 F2d at 652, quoting Warner Communications, 581 F Supp at 1492.
40. Lewis, 949 F2d at 652.
41. Id at 653. This ruling was made upon consideration of the appellant's claim that
the Release failed to explain the additional cost that the Amendment generated for the
shareholders because it changed the nature of their investment. Id at 650.
42. Id at 652. In declining to impose such a rule, the court said if it held Chrysler
liable for failing to disclose the cost of the Amendment to the shareholders, it would force
companies to either make estimates of the cost of such future developments, or make no
announcement at all regarding prospective developments of similar magnitude. Id at 653.
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Appellant further argued that statements made by Chrysler Di-
rector Lutz, were false and misleading, and constituted a violation
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."s The court determined that since
Lutz's statement made no claim, on its face or otherwise, that the
Amendment to the poison pill plan was for the benefit of share-
holders, then it could not constitute a misrepresentation." Nor
could Lutz's failure to state that the Amendment was made for the
benefit of the shareholders be considered an omission of a material
fact, since he had no duty to declare the motives for the
Amendment.'
6
The appellant's final allegation, that Chrysler and its board vio-
lated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act4" by distributing
"false and misleading proxy materials", was also held by the court
to be conclusory, because it did not plead with the particularity
required by FRCP 9(b) the specific omissions or misrepresenta-
tions that were alleged.4
Rule 10b-54 1 was promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission in 1942, and was directed towards prohibiting individ-
uals or companies from fraudulently purchasing securities.4 9 One of
the first decisions interpreting Rule 10b-5 was Birnbaum v New-
port Steel Corp.50 In Birnbaum, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
Craftmatic indicates that determining when an omission or misstatement is material is es-
pecially difficult when they involve "projections, estimates and forecasts." Craftmatic, 890
F2d at 642.
43. Lewis, 949 F2d at 651. Appellant's complaint quotes Lutz, "...that stiffening the
Poison Pill was the 'prudent thing to do' because he was not sure that Kerkorian's inten-
tions would not be hostile to current management." Paragraph 22 of Appellant's Amended
Complaint, quoting The Wall Street Journal, (December 19, 1990).
44. Lewis, 949 F2d at 653.
45. Id.
46. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat 92 (1934), codified at 15 USC
§78n(a) (1990).
47. Lewis, 949 F2d at 653.
48. 17 CFR §240.10b-5 (1990).
49. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) was issued at the
same time Rule 10b-5 was instituted by the SEC.
50. 193 F2d 461 (2d Cir 1952), cert denied, 343 US 956 (1952).
In Birnbaum, the minority shareholders filed suit against the controlling shareholder al-
leging a §10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violation occurred because he failed to properly consider a
merger that would have financially benefitted all stockholders, but instead sold his shares at
a premium price. Id at 463. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that the
intent of Rule 10b-5 was only to guard purchasers or sellers of securities from fraud, and
therefore the rule did not provide protection for the minority shareholders in this case. Id.
Although the court could have ended its analysis there, it also noted that even if the minor-
ity shareholders could be considered "purchasers or sellers", Congress did not intend for
Rule 10b-5 to act as a protection for shareholders against corporate mismanagement. Id at
464.
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peals declared that Rule 10b-5 was aimed "solely at that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with
the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mis-
management of corporate affairs."51 Although the case was decided
on other grounds, it appeared that the Second Circuit was pre-
pared to deny claims under Rule 10b-5 that were based on asser-
tions of corporate mismanagement.5 2
Any fears that might have been fostered by the statement made
by the court in Birnbaum were dispelled when the Second Circuit
court handed down its decision in A. T. Brod & Co. v Perlow.5 In
overturning the District court's ruling to dismiss the complaint,
the court stated,
[I]t [is not] sound to dismiss a complaint merely because the alleged scheme
does not involve the type of fraud that is 'usually associated with the sale or
purchase of securities.' We believe that 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit all.
fraudulent schemes in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
whether the artifices employed involve a garden type variety of fraud, or
present a unique form of deception. Novel or atypical methods should not
provide immunity from the securities laws.5
4
In a unanimous decision, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly sup-
ported the result reached by the Second Circuit court when it
quoted the above language in a 1971 case, Superintendent of In-
surance of New York v Bankers Life & Casualty Co.." The Court
also noted that Congress did not intend for Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 to be narrowly construed, but rather intended for these sec-
51. Id at 464.
52. See note 50 and accompanying text.
53. 375 F2d 393 (2d Cir 1967). In Brod, a broker filed suit under the security laws
against a customer who refused to pay for securities he had purchased. Id at 394. The bro-
ker alleged that the customer schemed to pay only for the securities that increased in value
when payment became due, refusing to pay for the securities which had declined in value.
Id.
54. Id at 397.
55. Superintendent of Insurance of New York v Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404
US 6, 11 n 7 (1971). The liquidator of Manhattan Casualty Co. alleged that Manhattan (a
wholly owned subsidiary of Bankers Life & Casualty Co.) was defrauded by Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., when an officer of Bankers sold all of Manhattan's stock to an outside co-
conspirator, and arranged for payment of the stock with $5,000,000 of Manhattan's own
assets. Manhattan never received any of the proceeds of the sale, and its assets were de-
pleted by $5,000,000 to pay for the shares of stock. The petitioner claimed a Rule 10b-5
violation was committed by Bankers and its officer, in defrauding Manhattan out of the
proceeds of the sale of its stock. Bankers defended by asserting that Manhattan had failed
to assert a claim cognizable under Rule 10b-5, due to the fact that Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 did not apply when mere mismanagement by corporate officers was asserted. Bankers
Life, 404 US at 7-13. The Court rejected Bankers argument, overturning the lower court and
declaring that the petitioner had stated a valid claim under Rule lOb-5. Id at 13-4.
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tions to be put into play whenever fraud was used "in connection
with" a "sale" of securities, regardless of the means used to
deceive, or who perpetrated the deception. 6 While recognizing that
Congress did not intend for Section 10(b) to regulate mere internal
corporate mismanagement, the Court acknowledged that Congress
did intend to regulate fraudulent practices.57 The Court concluded
that fraud committed by corporate officers and/or directors was in-
cluded within the broad meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.58
After the decision in Brod, affirmed in Bankers Life, it was no
longer possible to assert that a private individual could not main-
tain an action under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against a corpo-
rate board and/or its officers for alleged corporate mismanage-
ment.5 9 There remained, however, the question of how to
determine if and when the mismanagement ran afoul of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
In Schoenbaum v Firstbrook,60 the Second Circuit introduced a
two-step test to determine whether management violated Rule
10b-5. 1 The court first required that the plaintiff show that man-
agement had exerted "controlling influence" over the corporation
to further the transaction.6 2 The second prong of the test required
the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was unfair to the corpo-
56. Id at 11-2. Here the Court cited HR Rep No 1383, 73d Cong, 2d Sess 6 (1958),
which stated that "disregard of trust relationships by those whom the law should regard as
fiduciaries, are all a single seamless web." The Report continued that "where practices legit-
imate for some purposes may be turned to illegitimate and fraudulent means, broad discre-
tionary powers [in the regulatory agency] have been found practically essential." Id at 12.
57. Bankers Life, 404 US at 12.
58. Id.
59. Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5 Corporate Mismanage-
ment Cases, 86 Harv L Rev 1007, 1020 (1973).
This note deals more specifically with the conceptual problem of how the courts deter-
mined that an officer or director, as a corporate fiduciary, could be charged with deceiving
the corporation, when a corporation is charged with constructive knowledge of "all material
facts of which its officer or agent receives notice or acquires knowledge while acting in the
course of his employment. . . even though the officer or agent does not in fact communicate
his knowledge to the corporation." Id, quoting William Fletcher, 3 Private Corporations
§790 at 21-2 (perm ed rev 1965).
60. Schoenbaum v Firstbrook, 405 F2d 215 (2d Cir 1968), cert denied, 395 US 906
(1969). Minority shareholders of Banff Oil, Ltd. brought a derivative suit against the major-
ity, alleging that it used its position of influence over Banff to persuade the company to sell
its treasury shares to the majority shareholder at a vastly reduced price, while all along the
majority had inside information that increased the value of the treasury shares it purchased.
Id at 216.
61. Schoenbaum, 405 F2d at 219.
62. Id.
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ration." If the plaintiff made the requisite showing under this two-
tiered test, then he could recover under Rule 10b-5." The
Schoenbaum test ushered in a new federal standard for corporate
insiders, to measure their behavior against the "controlling influ-
ence" criterion when conducting securities transactions.' What ex-
actly was "controlling influence"? What behavior or actions would
cause a transaction to be unfair? The courts looked to the other
securities laws for a more precise definition of "controlling influ-
ence," 66 and in a 1970 decision the Fifth Circuit expressly applied
the Schoenbaum definition of controlling influence as "an act,
practice or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud.
'67
The Shelly court held that the key issue in a Rule 10b-5 case is the
impairment of investment judgement, which it asserted can occur
either when management exerts controlling influence, or when
management withholds material information from shareholders.66
Two years later, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
dealt a blow to Schoenbaum and Shelly, when it highlighted the
alternative holding in Schoenbaum69 and concluded that when full
disclosure is made to the stockholders, the federal interest is satis-
fied and no 10b-5 violation occurs, even if controlling influence is
used to induce an unfair transaction. 70 Not all of the circuit courts
were convinced that the controlling interest test set forth in
Schoenbaum was dead, and an attempt to use a derivation of the
test was made by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Green v
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. .7 1 The Second Circuit court reversed the
63. Id at 220.
64. Id. As a possible alternative holding, the Second Circuit court also noted that the
majority shareholder, the company's directors and officers were guilty of deceiving the
shareholders. Id. This alternative holding would later become important. See Note, The
Controlling Influence Standard, 86 Harv L Rev at 1040.
65. Note, The Controlling Influence Standard, 86 Harv L Rev at 1040.
66. Id.
67. Shelly v Hensley, 430 F2d 819, 827 (5th Cir 1970).
68. Shelly, 430 F2d at 827.
69. See note 64 and accompanying text.
70. Popkin v Bishop, 464 F2d 714, 718 (2d Cir 1972). In Popkin, the court dismissed
a claim for relief under Rule lOb-5, for failure to allege a deception. Popkin, 464 F2d at 718.
The court stated that "[§]10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 are designed princi-
pally to impose a duty to disclose and inform rather than to become enmeshed in passing
judgments on information elicited." Id at 719-20.
71. Santa Fe Industries Inc v Green, 533 F2d 1283 (2d Cir 1976), rev'd 430 US 462
(1977). In Santa Fe, minority shareholders instituted a derivative suit against the majority
shareholder, when he allegedly set an unfairly low price for their stock and forced them to
sell to him through Delaware's short-form merger statute. Santa Fe, 533 F2d at 1284. The
minority shareholders conceded that the majority shareholder had made a full and fair dis-
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district court and concluded that Rule 10b-5 applied to "breaches
of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders with-
out any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure. ' 72 The
United State Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the ap-
proach taken by the Second Circuit, and reversed.7' The Court
noted that the language of Section 10(b) could not be stretched to
prohibit conduct that did not involve either deception or manipu-
lation.74 It stated that Section 10(b) speaks specifically "in terms
of manipulation and deception," with no history or legislative in-
tent on record to indicate that the scope of the statute should be
extended to cover acts of mismanagement or negligence by corpo-
rate fiduciaries. 75 It continued that in order to state a claim under
Rule 10b-5, a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud must be accompa-
nied by conduct that is alleged to be manipulative or deceptive
within the meaning of the rule.76
The Court explained that "manipulation" usually refers to
"practices . . .that are intended to mislead investors by artificially
affecting market activity," and Congress would not have used this
specific term in the statute if it had meant to include situations
where shareholders are treated unfairly by corporate fiduciaries.7
closure, but insisted that the unfairness of the transaction and the fact that they had no
recourse against the shareholder under state law required that Rule 10b-5 be applied to
grant them relief. Id.
72. Id at 1287. One justification for the court's conclusion lies in the fact that under
Delaware law, in connection with a short-form merger, the only recourse that the minority
shareholders had to block the merger was to seek court review of the price set for the value
of their stock. Note, Suits For Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After Santa Fe
Industries v Green, 91 Harv L Rev 1874, 1879 (1978). If the court failed to grant relief to
the minority shareholders under Rule 10b-5 and the federal securities laws, they would have
no remedy at law. Note, Suits For Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 91 Harv L Rev at 1879.
73. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v Green, 430 US 462 (1977).
74. Sante Fe, 430 US at 473.
75. Id, quoting Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 214 (1976).
76. Sante Fe, 430 US at 473-4. In Part IV of its opinion, the Court supplemented its
holding by stating additional reasons why it would not be prudent to create a federal cause
of action for breaches of corporate fiduciary duty. Three Justices dissented from Part IV. Id
at 477-80.
One of the reasons given in Part IV is that since Congress did not expressly give individu-
als a private right of action under §10(b) and Rule 10b-5, to extend to them such a right in
corporate mismanagement cases would be unnecessary to ensure that Congressional intent
of the statute was fulfilled. Id at 477.
Another rational advanced for not extending the rule was that any expansion of the rule
to cover breach of fiduciary duty would collide with state laws governing the same area.
Again, the Court stated that absent specific Congressional intent to do so, it would be very
reluctant to intrude into an area already regulated by state law. Id at 478-9.
Neither of these auxiliary rationales were relied on by the court in Lewis.
77. Id at 476-7.
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Having settled the question of whether mere unfairness is actiona-
ble under Rule 10b-5, the next line of cases involved what actions
or omissions by management constituted deception or manipula-
tion within the meaning of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
In Biesenbach v Guenther, the minority shareholders contended
that management misrepresented that several financial and stock
transactions the directors conducted with the company were in the
best financial interests of the shareholders, while in fact these
statements were false and misleading within the meaning of Rule
10b-5.11 The essence of the plaintiff's allegation in Biesenbach was
that because the directors failed to disclose to the shareholders.
their breach of fiduciary duty, they violated Rule 10b-5.19 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt the approach
urged by the plaintiff, indicating that it would certainly contravene
the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe to make the board of
directors liable under Rule 10b-5 for failing to disclose its internal
mismanagement to the shareholders.80 The court noted that "[t]he
unclean heart of a director is not actionable, whether or not it is
'disclosed,' unless the impurities are translated into actionable
deeds or omissions both objective and external.""1 Therefore the
court refused to allow the plaintiff to come in the back door of
Rule 10b-5, to allege failure of the directors to disclose a breach of
fiduciary duty, and to use that failure to turn the claim into a fed-
eral securities violation,
There remained, however, the question of what type of disclos-
ure or omission by the directors could constitute an omission or
misstatement of a material fact. In a 1976 United States Supreme
Court decision, TSC Industries, Inc. v Northway, Inc., the Court
announced that an omitted fact is material if there is "a substan-
tial likelihood that under all the circumstances, the omitted fact
would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the
reasonable investor."8 It rejected the notion that an omitted fact
78. Biesenbach v Guenther, 588 F2d 400 (3d Cir 1978).
In Biesenbach, the plaintiffs, minority shareholders, alleged that the majority of the
board of directors of the company had violated Rule 10b-5 when they made loans to the
company at a high rate of interest and issued 1,000,000 new shares of stock in the company
after telling shareholders that they intended to authorize only 500,000. Id.
79. Id at 402.
80. Id.
81. Id., quoting from Lavin v Data Systems Analysts, Inc., 443 F Supp 104 (ED PA
1977).
82. TSC Industries, 426 US at 449. Although this case dealt with materiality in terms
of Rule 14a-9 of the Securities Exchange Act, (17 CFR §240.14a-9 (1975)) regarding misrep-
1992
Duquesne Law Review
should be considered material if a reasonable investor "might"
deem it important, pointing out that this "formulation is 'too sug-
gestive of mere possibility, however unlikely.' "83 The circuit courts
continued to analyze Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 cases, to deter-
mine whether the allegations asserted by plaintiffs were material
omissions or misrepresentations meeting the criteria of materiality
set forth in TSC Industries, or allegations of mere breach of fiduci-
ary duty by management.
In Panter v Marshall Field &.Co., 84 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals examined the plaintiffs' allegations that Marshall Field's
board of directors improperly rejected all merger offers made to it,
and failed to disclose to its shareholder its alleged plan to continue
to do so, regardless of the contents of any such proposal.8 5 It con-
cluded that absent any manipulation or deception, a contention
that management had entrenchment motives in carrying out its
duties did not violate any federal securities laws.86 The court char-
acterized the plaintiffs allegation as stating a case for a breach of
state law fiduciary duty, rather than a violation of Rule 10b-5. 7
The plaintiffs also alleged that pursuant to management's en-
trenchment policy, it issued numerous misstatements and omis-
sions of fact. 8 The court scrutinized all of the alleged misstate-
ments and omissions, and found. none that . overcame the
materiality requirement of TSC Industries." Of primary interest
was the determination made by the court that failure of the board
to disclose its five-year plans to shareholders did not constitute a
transgression of Rule 10b-5.90
resentations or omissions in proxy statements, its definition of materiality was ultimately
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Basic, 485 US 224, (see note 28 and accom-
panying text) to be used in determining materiality in Rule 10b-5 cases.
83. TSC Industries, 426 US at 449, quoting Gerstle v Gamble-Skogmo, 478 F2d 1281,
1302 (2d Cir 1973).
84. 646 F2d 271 (7th Cir 1981).
85. Panter, 646 F2d at 289. The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of Marshall Field &
Co., alleged that Field's management had a policy of summarily rejecting all merger offers
due to its desire to perpetuate its control over Fields. Id at 288.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court, quoting from a Second Circuit case, said that "[a] board of direc-
tors' decision to oppose or welcome a takeover attempt involves the exercise of directorial
judgment inherent in their role in corporate governance." Treadway Co. v Care Corp., 638
F2d 357, 381 (2d Cir 1980).
88. Panter, 646 F2d at 289.
89. Id at 289-93.
90. Id at 292. The court cited Freeman v Decio, 584 F2d 186, 199-200 (7th Cir 1978),
and Sundstrand Corp. v Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F2d 1033 (7th Cir 1977), cert denied 434
US 875 (1977), noting that while management is under no duty to disclose its financial pro-
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In a 1987 decision, the United States Supreme court adopted the
materiality approach set forth in TSC Industries for use in Rule
10b-5 cases. It cautioned, however, that the materiality standard
of TSC Industries cannot always be straightforwardly applied
when the event in question "is contingent or speculative in na-
ture".92 What the "reasonable investor" considers significant de-
pends on the probability of occurrence or nonoccurrence of the
event. 3
Finally, in Craftmatic Securities Litigation v Kraftsow,9' the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized that in cases in-
volving "soft information," such as projections, motives, and inten-
tions, determining whether the failure of management to disclose
this information violates Rule 10b-5 is difficult.9 5 The court reiter-
ated that "where the incremental value of disclosure is solely to
place potential investors on notice that management is culpable of
a breach of faith or incompetence, the failure to disclose does not
violate the securities acts." 96 While allowing that a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty under the federal securities law is ca-
pable of being made, the court emphasized that to constitute a
Rule 10b-5 violation, the breach must also include a material mis-
representation or nondisclosure.9
Thus, although the final word appears to be that when a mate-
rial misrepresentation or nondisclosure is alleged it is still possible
to state a federal securities law violation in terms of breach of fidu-
ciary duty, no court since Santa Fe has allowed such a claim. 8
jections, "once a company undertakes partial disclosure of such information there is a duty
to make the full disclosure of known facts necessary to avoid making such statements mis-
leading." Panter, 646 F2d At 292. This information, the court continued, must be also be
"reasonably certain" before its release to the public. Id.
91. Basic, 485 US at 232.
92. Id at 232.
93. Id. Basic dealt with statements made by Basic management over a two year pe-
riod that it was not engaged in merger negotiations, when in fact they were, and subse-
quently did announce a merger. Id. Former Basic shareholders sued under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, alleging that Basic's statements were false and misleading. Id.
94. 890 F2d 628 (3d Cir 1989).
95. Craftmatic, 890 F2d at 642.
96. Id at 640. The court also noted that "the line between a material nondisclosure
and the nondisclosure of mere mismanagement is often difficult to draw." Id at 639.
97. Id at 639.
98. In Goldberg v Meridor, 567 F2d 209 (2d Cir 1977), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit allowed minority shareholders to allege that a misleading
disclosure or a nondisclosure of a breach of fiduciary duty constituted a violation of Rule
10b-5, if the misleading information or nondisclosure caused the minority shareholders to be
lulled into a false sense of security and thus fail to seek the injunctive relief provided for
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Considering the. rulings from the United States Supreme Court
and its Circuit Courts of Appeal, it does not appear that the court
in Lewis could have reached a contrary decision.
Harriet Lewis made numerous allegations in her original and
amended complaints, challenging the truthfulness of the board of
director's statements and alleging intentional concealment by the
board of its entrenchment motives and cost of the poison pill plan
to shareholders. 9 She also maintained that the board breached its
fiduciary duty to the shareholders by enacting the Amendment. 00
It is noteworthy, however, that Ms. Lewis could not point to even
one particular statement or act that constituted a misstatement,
concealment or omission. The most she could do was suggest that
the language of the press release announcing the December 14,
1990 amendment to the poison pill plan and the statement by
Board Member Lutz regarding the reason that the poison pill plan
was strengthened, were "false and misleading."'01 Even had the re-
lease stated that the Amendment was effectuated in the best inter-
est of the shareholders, the Biesenbach decision would have pre-
cluded the court from finding Ms. Lewis' claim sufficient under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.112 Had Chrysler's board professed
that the Amendment was indeed implemented with a view toward
the shareholders' best interests, the assertion could not have been
shown to be false or misleading unless the plan only benefitted
management, and management knew of this fact when it made the
Release. Furthermore, Chrysler's board would have had to make
some outward manifestations of its knowledge of this information.
Compounding the problem for Ms. Lewis in this imaginative sce-
nario is the fact that the statement by the board would also be
required to surmount the materiality test under TSC Industries to
be considered under Rule 10b-5; i.e., the statement would have had
to assume "actual significance in the deliberations of the reasona-
ble shareholder." s If Chrysler's board had made the statements
as alleged by Ms. Lewis, and if they could be considered false and
misleading, they could never have passed the inspection of the ma-
under state law. Id.
However, in Lewis, we are not dealing with any allegation that the shareholder failed to
seek a remedy in state court due to the deception or silence of management as to their
breach their state law fiduciary duties.
99. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649-51.
100. Id at 647-8.
101. Id at 650-1.
102. See note 78 and accompanying text for discussion of the holding in Biesenbach.
.103. Lewis, 949 F2d at 649, quoting TSC Industries, 426 US at 449.
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teriality test. The court would have had to stretch dreadfully far to
conclude that a reasonable shareholder would not realize that
when management resists takeover attempts, it is also acting in its
own self-interest. The very nature of the term "take-over" should
leave no doubt in a "reasonable" shareholder's mind that this ac-
tion could certainly lead to undesirable changes in corporate man-
agement. Any implication that failure to disclose such information
to shareholders amounts to a material nondisclosure (which should
be penalized by the federal securities laws) is ludicrous.
The avowed purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to enable investors to reach
informed decisions regarding the purchase and sale of their securi-
ties.101 Investors are also charged with "knowledge of information
of which they reasonably should be aware." ' 5 None of the conduct
in which Ms. Lewis alleged Chrysler engaged, in either her original
or amended complaint, would prohibit a "reasonable" investor
from making a knowledgeable choice as to whether to buy or sell
Chrysler stock. On the contrary, Chrysler issued a press release no-
tifying the public of changes in its poison pill plan. Although it had
no federal duty to do so, Chrysler elected to keep the public in-
formed of its efforts to thwart the take-over attempt of Kerkorian.
By refusing to place a heavy a burden on Chrysler's board to
strictly scrutinize each statement it made regarding its motives,
the court in Lewis continued the policy of encouraging circulation
of information in the marketplace. A contrary rule would figura-
tively muzzle corporate management, making it exceedingly reluc-
tant to issue public statements at all, thereby achieving the exact
opposite effect that Rule 10b-5 was implemented to accomplish.
Another practice that the Lewis court expressly fostered is to
leave to state regulation conduct which merely consists of breach
of fiduciary duty, and to refuse to extend the federal securities
laws to areas already governed by state law.106 As the Supreme
Court noted in Santa Fe Industries, state law regulates corporate
management's fiduciary duty to its shareholders, and that supervi-
sion is best left to the states.10 7 This federalism consideration is
further justification for the court's refusal to allow Ms. Lewis to
make a federal securities claim based on her allegations.
Could there be a situation where a court would allow a plaintiff
to make out a claim of breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate
104. Note, The Controlling Influence Standard, 86 Harv L Rev at 1008.
105. Warner Communications, 581 F Supp at 1492.
106. Lewis, 949 F2d at 652.
107. Santa Fe Industries, 430 US at 479.
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board of directors or corporate management? It may be possible
for a plaintiff to demonstrate such a claim, by presenting evidence
that corporate management misrepresented or failed to disclose
material information that adversely affected his or her decision to
buy or sell stock in the marketplace. Perhaps there will be such a
case decided in the future, but the Third Circuit court was correct
in concluding that Lewis v Chrysler was not the proper vehicle in
which to do so.
Holly McCann
